Decision
Mr. F & Coillte
From Office of the Commissioner for Environmental Information (OCEI)
Case number: OCE-161017-J5W7L2
Published on
From Office of the Commissioner for Environmental Information (OCEI)
Case number: OCE-161017-J5W7L2
Published on
Whether Coillte was justified in refusing access to information requested under article 7(5) of the AIE Regulations and, whether it was entitled to redact information relating to staff members within records it released to the appellant on the basis of article 3(1) and article 8(a)(i).
24 October 2025
1. On 23 April 2025 the appellant made a request for information under the AIE Regulations for “Information related to the identification and control of invasive species in Forest Property MO16 ”.
2. On 15 May 2025 Coillte notified the appellant of its intention to extend the deadline for its decision by two months from the date of receipt, relying on article 7(2)(b) of the Regulations, stating:
“Members of the AIE Team have engaged with the relevant subject matter experts in relation to this Request. This engagement and the retrieval of any information that may exist / be relevant is currently underway but requires further input from the AIE Team and subject matter experts. This request may contain information relevant to external third parties. To allow for engagement with these parties and to ensure thorough searches and retrieval of information is conducted, I am extending the timeframe for dealing with your request ”.
3. On 23 June 2025 Coillte issued its original decision which stated:
“Following identification of records which relate to your request, I have decided that you should be granted access to these records. Please find attached one document which contains Information related to the identification and control of invasive species in Forest Property MO16 ”.
4. On 23 June 2025 the appellant requested an internal review, stating:
“There is no indication as to what searches have been conducted and that all information falling within the scope of my request has been identified. In particular there is no indication that searches have been conducted ;
a)for correspondence with external parties whose responsibilities may be implicated by the proposed works in the context of producing a management plan
b)for records of how the issue was identified in the first instance The request appears to have been interpreted narrowly rather than broadly ”.
5. On 23 July 2025 Coillte issued its internal review decision, varying the original decision and releasing two additional records to the appellant, stating:
“The Request, as worded, sought access to a specific category of records. I have reviewed the approach taken by the first instance decision team at Coillte in considering your request and locating records within the defined category, also I have considered the wording of your request for an internal review. I am satisfied that two (2) more records within the category, have been identified and are being provided to you with this letter. I am providing you with two (2) additional records, namely ‘Email Thread 1’ and ‘Email Thread 2 ’.
I can confirm that the record provided to you with the Decision, together with the two additional records provided today, constitute the full extent of information corresponding to the scope of the Request. I also confirm that no documents captured by the wording of the Request have been withheld from you .
Notwithstanding the above, the AIE Regulations do not impose a legal obligation on public authorities to detail the steps taken to locate information where the request has been granted and the information provided. The duty to demonstrate the adequacy of searches arises in the context of a refusal or partial refusal under Article 7(5) of the AIE Regulations, where a public authority asserts that it does not hold the requested information. In such cases, the Office of the Commissioner for Environmental Information (OCEI) has required authorities to show that reasonable steps were taken to locate the information. However, there is no equivalent provision requiring explanation of search steps when the request is granted. Where the request is granted in full, the rationale for such scrutiny does not arise. This position is consistent with the purpose of the AIE regime, which is to ensure access to environmental information, not to audit the internal processes of public authorities in every instance of compliance .
Moreover, there is no requirement under Directive 2003/4/EC or the Aarhus Convention for authorities to provide a breakdown of search efforts where the information has been located and released. The Directive focuses on ensuring access and sets out grounds for refusal, which must be interpreted restrictively. It does not extend to mandating procedural disclosures in cases of full compliance. The OCEI has not established a precedent requiring authorities to document or disclose search steps in such circumstances, and doing so would place an unnecessary administrative burden on public bodies without advancing the transparency objectives of the legislation ”.
6. The appellant appealed to this Office on 30 July 2025 on the basis of his view that Coillte had not provided sufficient information with respect to article 7(5) and, that there was no basis for Coillte to redact information pertaining to staff acting in the course of their duties.
7. I have now completed my review under article 12(5) of the Regulations. In carrying out my review, I have had regard to the submissions made by the appellant and Coillte. In addition, I have had regard to:
• the Guidance document provided by the Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government on the implementation of the AIE Regulations (the Minister’s Guidance);
• Directive 2003/4/EC (the AIE Directive), upon which the AIE Regulations are based;
• the 1998 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention); and
• The Aarhus Convention—An Implementation Guide (Second edition, June 2014) (‘the Aarhus Guide’).
8. What follows does not comment or make findings on each and every argument advanced, but all relevant points have been considered.
9. In accordance with article 12(5) of the AIE Regulations, my role is to review the public authority’s internal review decision and to affirm, annul or vary it. Where appropriate in the circumstances of an appeal, I will require the public authority to make available environmental information to the appellant.
10. This appeal is concerned with whether Coillte was justified in refusing access to information requested under article 7(5) of the AIE Regulations and, whether it was entitled to redact information relating to staff members within in records it released to the appellant on the basis of article 3(1) and article 8(a)(i). ‘Staff information’ refers to the names and work contact details (emails/phone numbers) of Coillte staff which were redacted in the records.
11. I note that in its internal review decision Coillte did not identify its reliance on articles 3(1) and 8(a)(i) despite releasing with the decision, two redacted documents. It later sought to rely on both of these articles in its submissions to this Office. I remind Coillte that public authorities have a duty to give reasons for a decision, arising from the legal responsibility the public authority has under the AIE Regulations. It is also a recognised core principle in administrative law and a fundamental element of constitutional justice. A person having a request refused is entitled to be provided with clear reasons for that refusal so that they can form a view as to whether the refusal is justified, or whether a review of the refusal is warranted.
12. With respect to Coillte’s redaction of staff information within the released records, the appellant states:
“Information related to Coillte staff acting in the course of their duties is not personal information and no basis for refusal (redaction) has been provided ”.
13. With respect to searches and information the appellant contends has not been provided, the appellant states:
“My request sought information on the identification of the problem. No information has been provided in this regard .
An email of the 20-1-25 from the Coillte Forest Ecologist states "We had the site identified last year but never got around to it .".No information has been provided on this initial identification .
The earliest record provided (17-1-25) includes; “Just coming back to you for an update on all of this "
This strongly implies that there is information that pre-dates anything that Coillte have provided .There appears to be information missing from Thread 1 and Thread 2 (From, To and Subject for the top email). In the context of the handling of this request there is more than a hint of concealment .
There is no information provided on engagement with the competent authority for the Natura 2000 site (NPWS)
The Report states "The situation will be closely monitored by Coillte and NPWS will be consulted in relation to the management of the bamboo." This implies that there should be some records of engagement between the two parties ”.
14. The appellant made further submissions with respect to his contention that Coillte had not met its obligations under article 7(5) of the Regulations, outlining his view that public authorities, even in instances where records are released, should provide details as to searches undertaken, stating:
“Article 7(1) of the Regulations states that "A public authority shall, notwithstanding any other statutory provision and subject only to these Regulations, make available to the applicant any environmental information, the subject of the request, held by, or for, the public authority." It is implicit in this, that relevant searches have been undertaken to identify all information falling within the scope of the request. I contend that the same level of reasoning is required for a granted request as for a refused request; particularly where there are concerns that not all information has been provided ”.
“A requester is entitled to understand a decision; not just a refusal. This is only possible where a public authority discloses the searches that were undertaken on the request irrespective of whether the request is granted or refused. It was not explained in the internal review decision how two additional records were located. What additional searches were undertaken to identify these two records that were missed the first time around? Coillte should explain why they missed the information at the initial decision stage ”.
15. The appellant also noted his appeal concerned whether Coillte was justified in applying a month extension to the internal review decision response, noting that “It certainly is not voluminous. At the initial decision stage, a single Report was provided ”.
16. The appellant’s submission was shared with Coillte and in response, Coillte provided a submission to this Office, outlining its position with respect to issues raised concerning searches undertaken and its obligations under article 7(5) and, with respect to redactions made to the released records concerning staff information.
17. With respect to the identification of information coming under the scope of the request, Coillte state:
“First, I shall address the Appellant’s statement in the Appeal Document, wherein he claims: “It was not explained in the internal review decision how two additional records were located.” This assertion is incorrect. The Decision clearly sets out that the internal review decision-maker adopted a broader interpretation of the Request, informed by the more developed language used by the Appellant in his internal review application, specifically the reference to “correspondence with external parties.” This refinement clarified the scope of the Request and resulted in the inclusion of two additional records that were deemed to fall within its scope .
Second, I will address why records have not been provided regarding the identification of invasive species in Forest Property MO16. The issue, specifically the presence of rhododendron, laurel, Gaultheria shallon, and bamboo, was first raised verbally by a local resident to the Estates Manager of Business Area Unit 1 in August 2023. The Estates Manager subsequently held further verbal discussions with another stakeholder between June and October 2024 regarding the issue .
Following consultation with the Estates Manager, I am satisfied that no written or recorded documentation exists in relation to these conversations. The Estates Manager has confirmed that he did not create any material records of these discussions. I refer to the Commissioner’s findings in decision OCE-144200-P5J0S4 (Mr F and Coillte), which confirm that it is appropriate, where reasonable, for a public authority to rely on the knowledge of its officers, particularly those who are specialists or senior subject-matter experts, when determining that information relevant to a request does not exist (paragraph 71). Coillte submits that it is reasonable to rely on the Estates Manager’s recollection to confirm that no recorded information exists in relation to the identification of invasive species in MO16 .
In this case, while the conversations did occur, they were conducted entirely verbally and were not documented. Therefore, the information sought does not exist in material form. I refer to Raidió Teilifís Éireann v The Commissioner for Environmental Information (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 160, where the Court held that “the Directive does not require a public authority to create a record that does not otherwise exist.” (Paragraph 77) .
Accordingly, I confirm that the earliest existing record relevant to the Request is the email from the external stakeholder to Coillte dated 17 January 2025 that, together with all subsequent records, have been provided to the Appellant. Coillte affirms that it has fully complied with the Request by providing the Appellant access to the only corresponding records. The Appellant has been granted all information that exists within the scope of the Request ”.
18. With respect to information redacted in the released records, Coillte state:
“The grounds for Coillte’s decision to redact the staff members’ names and contact details from the records provided to the Appellant is that such information does not constitute “environmental information” under Article 3 of the AIE Regulations. Since employee names do not contribute to the environmental content or analysis of a record, Coillte's decision to redact them remains justified, and the Appeal lacks a valid basis for reconsideration, for reasons set out as follows .
The AIE Regulations entitle members of the public to request “environmental information”. The AIE Regulations do not provide members of the public with a right to obtain all information contained in a document that includes environmental information. The entitlement to information pursuant to the AIE Regulations depends on whether that information is “environmental information ”.
The information redacted on the Released Record is not environmental information and accordingly Coillte is not obliged to disclose same. The redaction made to the Released Record relates only to information that is not environmental information. Article 3 of the AIE Regulations defines “environmental information” as follows :
“environmental information” means any information in written, visual, aural, electronic or any other material form on —
(a):The state of the elements of the environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape and natural sites including wetlands, coastal and marine areas, biological diversity and its components, including genetically modified organisms and the interaction among these elements ,
(b)factors, such as substances, energy, noise, radiation or waste, including radioactive waste, emissions, discharges and other releases into the environment, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment ,
(c)measures (including administrative measures), such as policies, legislation, plans, programmes, environmental agreements, and activities affecting or likely to affect the elements and factors referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) as well as measures or activities designed to protect those elements ,
(d)reports on the implementation of environmental legislation ,
(e)cost-benefit and other economic analyses and assumptions used within the framework of the measures and activities referred to in paragraph (c), and
(f)the state of human health and safety, including the contamination of the food chain, where relevant, conditions of human life, cultural sites and built structures inasmuch as they are, or may be, affected by the state of the elements of the environment referred to in paragraph (a) or, through those elements, by any of the matters referred to in paragraphs (b) and (c) .
Coillte submits that the Redacted Information does not fall within the above definition. In particular, the Redacted Information is not captured by Articles 3(1)(a), (b), (d), (e) or (f) of the AIE Regulations. Furthermore, the Redacted Information is not captured by Article 3(1)(c) taking the following into consideration :
a.Whether the Redacted Information is information “on” a measure or activity; and
b.Whether the Redacted Information is “likely to affect the elements and factors referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) as well as measures or activities designed to protect those elements ”.
Coillte has determined that the Redacted Information is not information “on” a measure or activity. In reaching that decision we have considered the following :
a.Whether the record (an email) being provided is intelligible without regard to the Redacted Information. Coillte has determined that it is ;
b.Whether the Redacted Information is integral or incidental to the records. We have determined that the Redacted Information is incidental to the records and thus to the “measure” or “activity” to which the record relates. The Redacted Information does not bear upon the purpose for which the record was created or the reliance that may be placed on the record. Consequently, the Redacted Information could not even potentially have any impact on the environment; and
c.Whether it would be artificial to separate the Redacted Information from the Released Record. Coillte has determined that it would not be artificial. Rather, separating the Redacted Information from the record reflects the reality that the Redacted Information is not integral to the records .
Coillte has also determined that the Redacted Information is not “likely to affect the elements and factors referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) as well as measures or activities designed to protect those elements ”.
More generally, Coillte has reflected upon whether access to the Redacted Information would serve the objective set out in Recital 1 of the AIE Directive: “Increased public access to environmental information and the dissemination of such information contribute to a greater awareness of environmental matters, a free exchange of views, more effective participation by the public in environmental decision-making and, eventually, to a better environment ”. Coillte has concluded that obtaining access to the Redacted Information would not contribute to greater awareness of environmental matters or more effective participation by the public in environmental decision-making.
Coillte submits that, the identity of the Coillte staff member that received the email from the external stakeholder, as redacted, and the staff members who liaised internally regarding the subject matter are entirely irrelevant and incidental to the emails. Nothing about the identity of the author and recipients of the said emails could even potentially have an impact on the environment. Whether the emails will impact the environment is a product of the use of the environmental information within each record / email, which is not determined by reference to the identity of the individuals whose details have been redacted. Therefore, information disclosing the identity of these individuals is not information “on” a measure or activity. Coillte submits that, it without prejudice to the Decision, the Redacted Information does not satisfy the definition of “environmental information” in Article 3(1) of the AIE Regulations.
Further to the above, it is clear that the Redacted Information is not “likely to affect the elements on the environment and factors referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) ”. As the Commissioner has previously indicated, “A measure or activity is “likely to affect” the elements and factors of the environment if there is a real and substantial possibility that it will affect the environment, whether directly or indirectly ”. There is no real or substantial possibility that the identity of the individuals redacted will affect the environment, whether directly or indirectly.
The Released Records can be readily understood without access to the Redacted Information. In redacting the names and contact details of staff members, Coillte has taken care to ensure that the origin and recipients of the correspondence remain clear. To support transparency and ease of understanding, Coillte retained domain names, organisational identifiers, and the functional roles of the staff members involved.
Without prejudice to Coillte’s position that the Redacted Information is not environmental information, if the Redacted Information were environmental information, Coillte submits it would be obliged to redact the Redacted Information pursuant to Article 8(a)(i) of the AIE Regulations, for the following reasons.
a.Article 8(a)(i) of the AIE Regulations provides that: “A public authority shall not make available environmental information in accordance with article 7 where disclosure of the information— (a) would adversely affect— (i) the confidentiality of personal information relating to a natural person who has not consented to the disclosure of the information, and where that confidentiality is otherwise protected by law ,”
b. The Commissioner has previously indicated:
“When relying on article 8(a)(i) of the AIE Regulations a public authority must show that – a) the information at issue is personal information relating to a natural person, who has not consented to its disclosure; b) the personal information has an element of confidentiality, c) the confidentiality of that personal information is protected by law; and d) the disclosure of the information at issue would adversely affect that confidentiality .
I have applied each aspect of this test and determined as follows.
First, the Redacted Information is personal information relating to a natural person, given that the Redacted Information comprises names of natural persons. These people have not consented to the disclosure of the Redacted Information. In this regard, Coillte notes for clarity only that “personal information ” is not defined in the AIE Regulations. While the FOI Act (to which Coillte is not subject) defines “personal information ” to exclude, for example, the names of persons who hold positions as members of staff of FOI bodies, (section 2 of the FOI Act 2014, as amended) the Commissioner has determined that “personal information ” as used in the AIE Regulations corresponds with the definition of “personal data ” in the GDPR.3 “Personal data” is defined in the GDPR as:
“‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person ”;
_Therefore, it is clear that the redacted name and email address of the Coillte employees are “personal information ”for the purposes of the AIE Regulations .
Second, the Redacted Information as it appears in the Released Record is confidential. The record has not been made public .
Third, the privacy and confidentiality of the Redacted Information is protected by law, including by, at a minimum, the following legal instruments :
(a)the Irish Constitution ;
(b)the EU European Charter of Fundamental Rights; and
(c)the European Convention on Human Rights .
Fourth, if the Redacted Information were disclosed to the Appellant that would necessarily adversely affect the confidentiality of the Redacted Information. I note in this regard that there is no limit on the use to which information disclosed pursuant to the AIE Regulations may be put. In other words, disclosure pursuant to the AIE Regulations is deemed to be disclosure to the world at large .
Having regard to Coillte’s determination that the Redacted Information is not environmental information and the fact that I have provided comments in relation to Article 8(a)(i) without prejudice to that determination, it is not necessary to perform the balancing exercise required by Article 10(3) of the AIE Regulations. However, were that exercise is required Coillte would weigh the public interest served by disclosure of the Redacted Information against the interest served by redaction of the Redacted Information as follows :
Factors in favour of granting access to the Redacted Information include :
a.Openness and transparency in operations and business ongoing at Coillte; and
b.The widest possible systematic availability and dissemination to the public of environmental information .
Factors in favour of refusing access include :
a.The fact that Article 8(a)(i) is a mandatory rather than discretionary ground of refusal; and
b.The fact that disclosure of the Redacted Information would prejudice the privacy and confidentiality rights of those whose identities would be disclosed .
c.The fact that in the past Coillte employees and external contractors have been subjected to unsolicited and/or intimidatory and/or threatening and/or confrontational communications and/or behaviour, including (i) a confrontation with a requester at a forest site, (ii) emails received from a requester by Coillte personnel which included threats to report them to the Soil Association, and (iii) unsolicited communications from a requester to an external contractor after the contractor had been identified in a record released pursuant to the AIE Regulations. Therefore, there is a real risk that disclosure of the Redacted Information, which constitutes disclosure to the world at large, will not only prejudice the rights of those whose identities would be disclosed, but could consequently result in Coillte personnel being subjected to similar inappropriate communications and behaviour .
Coillte has determined that the factors in favour of disclosure are not outweighed by those favouring refusal of access, particularly as no information has been provided regarding the Appellant’s specific interests or motives in seeking the Redacted Information. Accordingly, Coillte is unable to weigh those considerations in the balance. Having regard to the fact that disclosure would set aside privacy and confidentiality rights, a particularly strong public interest in disclosure of the Redacted Information would be required. While there may be a public interest in disclosure of the record, as redacted, it is not apparent that there is a public interest in disclosure of the Redacted Information. It is not evident that there is a particularly strong public interest in knowing the identity of the parties to the emails which have been redacted ”.
19. Coillte’s submission was shared with the appellant, and, in providing further comments, the appellant states: “Information related to Coillte staff acting in the course of their duties is not personal information that falls to be refused under Article 8(a)(i) as no confidentiality in law or adverse effect has been demonstrated. As a matter of course staff in a public authority should identify themselves when engaging with the public. This is a requirement for members of the Civil Service under the Civil Service Code of Standards & Behaviour. Although I have been informed that members of staff in Coillte are not technically Civil Servants it is reasonable to expect that they would adhere to similar standards being representatives of a public authority ”.
20. A draft decision was shared with both parties on 15 October 2025 inviting further submissions limited to additional relevant points of fact seeking to advance a point of fact not previously submitted, and/or, to highlight any error in fact or error in law in the draft decision.
21. Coillte did not return any further submissions.
22. The appellant provided further submissions with respect to his contentions that Coillte have not conducted adequate searches pursuant to 7(5), with emphasis on his view regarding which subject matter expert was consulted in regard to the AIE request and the internal transfer of information within Coillte. Further submissions were also provided regarding his disagreement with the application of article 8(a)(i) to the appeal with respect to the phone numbers of staff, I have had regard to these points.
23. The appellant also outlined his view that Coillte had incorrectly applied an extension to the original decision, invoking article 7(2), I note that the appellant is dissatisfied with emphasis on the fact that Coillte invoked an extension but then did not identify or release a significant number of records. I am of the view however that there does not have to be a relationship between the time taken to search/identify records and the number released, the facts of each case are considered on their own merits and in this case I am satisfied that the extension was invoked in good faith, given the nature of the information and that Coillte had to consult with third parties.
Article 7(5)
24. In this case the appellant contends that Coillte should hold further information relevant to his request. Article 7(5) of the AIE Regulations is the relevant provision to consider, where the question arises as to whether the requested environmental information or any further environmental information is held by or for the public authority concerned. It provides as follows:
“Where a request is made to a public authority and the information requested is not held by or for the authority concerned, that authority shall inform the applicant as soon as possible that the information is not held by or for it ”.
25. What will be considered reasonable will vary from case to case, but as a general guide, I set out below the type of information that the Office would generally expect to be set out in a decision where a public authority is relying on article 7(5) of the regulations:
(i) an outline of exactly which areas/units etc. of the organisation were searched for the information;
(ii) an explanation of how searches were carried out (i.e. manually, by computer, by name, by key words). Keywords should be recorded and provided in the decision as appropriate;
(iii) details of the individuals consulted in connection with the search;
(iv) a description of the searches carried out to cover the possibility of misfiled/misplaced records;
(v) details of guidelines, practices, procedures and arrangements in relation to the storage, filing, archiving, retention and destruction of the type of information requested in this case;
(vi) the basis on which the public authority has concluded that it does not hold any information within the scope of the appellant’s request and that no such information is held by any other person or body on its behalf.
26. This Office’s approach to dealing with this type of case is to assess whether adequate steps have been taken to identify and locate relevant environmental information, having regard to the particular circumstances. In determining whether the steps taken are adequate in the circumstances, a standard of reasonableness is applied. What will be considered reasonable will vary from case to case.
27. The specific search questions raised by the appellant which are detailed in paragraph 13, regarding information he contends has not been provided concerning the identification of invasive species and Coillte’s engagement with NPWS, are in my view addressed adequately by Coillte, detailed in its response in paragraph 17.
28. It would appear to me that following receipt of the internal review request which provided further information by the appellant in terms of scope, detailed in paragraph 5, Coillte undertook further searches, subsequently identifying additional records. The logic of these events is, in my view, explained to the appellant in the internal review decision in seeking to contextualise how additional records were identified.
29. With respect to the appellant’s contention that further information may exist as records released refer to previous communication regarding the information in scope, I note that Coillte has addressed and provided reasoning in respect of same, contending that previous communication was verbal and that no records were created or exist concerning it. The communication in question concerns conversations between local residents and the Estates Manger in BAU 1 who was consulted as part of the request and who confirmed that no records were created. I find that on the balance of probabilities, given the nature of the communication and the fact that it concerns one Coillte staff member who has directly testified to not creating records relating to it, that the threshold of 7(5) has been met here.
30. I note the appellant’s statement that “There is no information provided on engagement with the competent authority for the Natura 2000 site (NPWS) ” however it would not be appropriate for me to attribute this to inadequate or incomplete searches on behalf of Coillte. While I acknowledge the appellant’s view that further information in the scope of this appeal with respect to the NPWS should exist and be held by Coillte, it is important to note that where a public authority refuses a request for records under article 7(5) of the Regulations, the question we must consider is whether the body has taken all reasonable steps to ascertain the whereabouts of relevant records. The AIE Regulations does not require absolute certainty as to the existence or location of records, as situations arise where records are lost or simply cannot be found, or, indeed, may have been destroyed in line with the body’s records management policies.
31. It is also important to note that we do not generally expect public authorities to carry out extensive or indefinite general searches for records simply because an applicant asserts that more records should or might exist or rejects a public authorities body's explanation of why a record does not exist. The test in article 7(5) is whether the body has taken all reasonable steps to locate the record sought.
32. Having considered the submissions of the parties and the information already released by Coillte, I am satisfied that Coillte has taken all reasonable steps to identify information within the scope of the request.
33. To conclude my assessment of the 7(5) aspects of the appeal I wish to comment on contentions in the submissions regarding article 7(1) and searches. The appellant contends that it is “implicit ” in article 7(1) that relevant searches have been undertaken to identify information falling within the scope of the request and while I agree with that understanding, in my view it does not confer an obligation on public authorities to detail their search efforts routinely with each AIE request they process. Notwithstanding that each case must be considered on its own facts and circumstances, I consider that the obligation on public authorities to demonstrate they have taken reasonable steps to identify information requested arises in cases where they contend that no information exists in relation to the request as a whole or, with respect to an aspect of the request. Not, as contended by the appellant, information which the public authority is obliged to automatically provide in the case of each AIE request.
Staff Information redacted under article 3(1)
34. Article 3(1) of the AIE Regulations provides that “environmental information ” means:
Any information in written, visual, aural, electronic or any other material form on:
(a) the state of the elements of the environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape and natural sites including wetlands, coastal and marine areas, biological diversity and its components, including genetically modified organisms and the interaction among these elements,
(b) factors, such as substances, energy, noise, radiation or waste, including radioactive waste, emissions, discharges and other releases into the environment, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment,
(c) measures (including administrative measures), such as policies, legislation, plans, programmes, environmental agreements, and activities affecting or likely to affect the elements and factors referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) as well as measures or activities designed to protect those elements,
(d) reports on the implementation of environmental legislation,
(e) cost-benefit and other economic analyses and assumptions used within the framework of the measures and activities referred to in paragraph (c), and
(f) the state of human health and safety, including the contamination of the food chain, where relevant, conditions of human life, cultural sites and built structures inasmuch as they are, or may be, affected by the state of the elements of the environment referred to in paragraph (a) or, through those elements, by any of the matters referred to in paragraphs (b) and (c)”
35. The right of access under the AIE Regulations is to information “on ” one or more of the six categories at (a) to (f) of the above definition. According to national and EU case law on the definition of “environmental information ”, while the concept of “environmental information ” as defined in the AIE Directive is broad (Mecklenburg at paragraph 19), there must be more than a minimal connection with the environment (Glawischnig at paragraph 25). Information does not have to be intrinsically environmental to fall within the scope of the definition (Redmond at paragraph 58; see also ESB at paragraph 43). However, a mere connection or link to the environment is not sufficient to bring information within the definition of environmental information. Otherwise, the scope of the definition would be unlimited in a manner that would be contrary to the judgments of the Court of Appeal and the CJEU. Under Article 3(1)(c) the connection between the information and the environment is found in the measure in question and not necessarily in the information itself.
Identification of a measure or activity
36. In my view, paragraph (c) of the definition is the most relevant to this review. Paragraph (c) requires the identification of a relevant measure or activity, which the information sought is “on ”. Information may be “on ” more than one measure or activity (Henney at paragraph 42). In identifying the relevant measure or activity, one may consider the wider context and is not strictly limited to the precise issue with which the information is concerned (ESB at paragraph 43). The list of examples of measures and activities given at paragraph (c) is not exhaustive, but it contains illustrative examples (Redmond at paragraph 55). The CJEU stated in Mecklenburg that the term ‘measure’ serves “merely to make it clear that the acts governed by the Directive included all forms of administrative activity ” (at paragraph 20, emphasis added). The Irish High Court adopted a similarly expansive approach to the term ‘activity’ (RTÉ at paragraph 19).
37. In this case, records have been released to the appellant which encompass email threads between Coillte staff members with respect to the identification and control of invasive species in Forest Property MO16. I consider that actions taken by Coillte to identify and control invasive species in Forest Property MO16 can clearly be considered a measure or activity within the meaning of paragraph (c) of article 3(1) of the AIE Regulations.
Whether the measure or activity is affecting, likely to affect or designed to protect the environment
38. A measure or activity is “likely to affect ” the elements and factors of the environment if there is a real and substantial possibility that it will affect the environment, whether directly or indirectly. Collins J, delivering judgment on behalf of the Court of Appeal in Redmond, noted that “something more than a remote or theoretical possibility is required (because that would sweep too widely and could result in the ‘general and unlimited right of access’ that Glawischnig indicates the AIE Directive was not intended to provide) but it is not necessary to establish the probability of a relevant environmental impact (because that would, in my opinion, sweep too narrowly and risk undermining the fundamental objectives of the AIE Directive) ” (paragraph 63).
39. I consider that actions taken by Coillte to identify and control invasive species in Forest Property MO16 will self evidently have an environmental impact. Work of this nature concerns strategies and actions taken to manage and reduce the impact and harm of non-native species on local ecosystems. This work will directly affect elements of the environment.
Whether the information sought is “on” the relevant measure or activity
40. Having regard to the wording of article 3(1)(c) of the Regulations, it now falls to be considered whether the information sought is information “on ” a relevant measure. As “any information … on ” a measure or activity affecting or likely to affect the environment is prima facie environmental information, the information at issue does not, in itself, have to affect or be likely to affect the environment in order to constitute information “on ” such a measure (Redmond at paragraphs 57 and 59). As the High Court outlined in its decision in the ESB No. 1 case, relying on the English Court of Appeal decision in Henney, that information is “on ” a measure if it is about, relates to or concerns the measure (see paragraph 41 of ESB No. 1, referring to paragraph 37 in Henney). The question as to whether information is “on ” a measure is fact and context specific. This question is to be considered by reference to the Directive and Aarhus Convention. According to Henney, the recitals to both the Directive and Convention “give an indication of how the very broad language of the text of the provisions may have to be assessed and provide a framework for determining the question of whether in a particular case information can properly be described as "on" a given measure ” (at paragraph 48).
41. Importantly, while Henney uses the terms “critical ”, “fundamental ” or “integral ”, it did so to describe the relationship between the communications and data component of the smart meter plan and the overall smart meter plan. There was a dispute in that case between the parties as to what was the correct measure. The Court did not use these terms to say that for information to be on a measure it had to be critical, fundamental or integral to that measure.
42. While the test as to whether records constitute environmental information is whether they relate or are connected to a measure within the meaning of article 3(1) of the AIE Regulations, it is clear that the records themselves do not have to be capable of affecting the elements of the environment. In Redmond, the Court noted that in Minch a document that “in itself …. could obviously have no implications for the environment since it was concerned with financial modelling ” was nonetheless “environmental information ” for the purposes of the AIE Regulations. (paragraph 60). As the High Court outlined in its decision in the ESB No. 1 case, relying on the English Court of Appeal decision in Henney, that information is “on ” a measure if it is about, relates to or concerns the measure (see paragraph 41 of ESB No. 1, referring to paragraph 37 in Henney).
43. Information redacted by Coillte on the released records is composed of the names/contact details of Coillte staff. Coillte have contended that the information itself does not constitute the definition of environmental information as defined in article 3(1), and that “separating the Redacted Information from the record reflects the reality that the Redacted Information is not integral to the records ”. However, it is clear from the relevant case law that the specific information within the record does not itself have to be critical, fundamental or integral to the measure to be considered as ‘on ’ the measure nor did it have be to capable of affecting the elements of the environment it and of itself.
44. Having considered the matter, I am satisfied that the names and contact details of the relevant Coillte staff members are sufficiently related to the measure at issue in this case, which is actions taken by Coillte to identify and control invasive species in Forest Property MO16. The emails in question have been identified by Coillte as falling within the scope of this request. The name of a person responsible for drafting and/or sending the emails is in my view a core component of that email. In my view it would create unacceptable artificiality to find that the emails themselves were environmental information, but the names of the drafter/sender of the emails whose unredacted job titles include “forester ” and “forest ecologist ” respectively, were not.
45. Coillte has provided extensive submissions as to why, in its view, the redacted information does not fall within the meaning of “environmental information ”. If, however, we are to accept Coillte’s approach here, public authorities and this Office, in the case of appeals before it, would need to examine a record/document line by line, indeed word by word, to ascertain whether each word or sentence can be understood as environmental information under the 3-part test of 3(1). This would not only be unworkable in a practical sense but in my view, it is not in the spirit of the AIE regime. I note that where a record/document is identified as containing environmental information defined under article 3(1) there are exemptions provided for in the AIE Regulations to redact and remove information within it using the appropriate exemption under the AIE Regulations, where appropriate. I therefore find that the information requested is, as a whole, environmental information.
Staff Information redacted under article 8(a)(i)
46. Coillte has sought to rely on article 8(a)(i) to redacted staff information in the records. In order to rely on article 8(a)(i) the information must show disclosure of the information— “(a) would adversely affect— (i) the confidentiality of personal information relating to a natural person who has not consented to the disclosure of the information, and where that confidentiality is otherwise protected by law.”
GDPR
47. I consider it appropriate to briefly set out the approach to personal data under the AIE Regime with reference to the GDPR.
48. Article 8(a)(i) seeks to transpose Article 4(2)(f) of the AIE Directive, which enables Member States to provide for refusal of a request where disclosure would “adversely affect … the confidentiality of personal data and/or files relating to a natural person where that person has not consented to the disclosure of the information to the public, where such confidentiality is provided for by national or Community law ”.
49. The final paragraph of Article 4(2) states, referring to the predecessor to the GDPR: “Within this framework, and for the purposes of the application of subparagraph (f), Member States shall ensure that the requirements of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data are complied with .”
50. In light of this, I consider that the reference to “personal information ” in article 8(a)(i) of the AIE Regulations to be consistent with the meaning of “personal data ” under the GDPR, a concept with which every public authority is now very familiar. It is clear from this final paragraph of Article 4(2) of the AIE Directive that the AIE regime is intended to interact harmoniously with the European data protection regime. In the same vein, Article 86 of the GDPR (read with recital 154) permits the disclosure of personal data in accordance with information access regimes under EU or national law, where those regimes reconcile the right of access to information with the right to protection of personal data. This again indicates that the GDPR is intended to interact harmoniously with national and European regimes offering public access to information.
51. In Ireland, article 86 of the GDPR is implemented by section 44(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018, which provides: “For the purposes of Article 86, personal data contained in environmental information may be disclosed where the information is made available under and in accordance with the [AIE] Regulations pursuant to a request within the meaning of those Regulations .” On one view, this could be considered to be a standalone ‘gateway ’ for the disclosure of personal data under the GDPR, permitting disclosure of all personal data contained in environmental information pursuant to an AIE request. However, the CJEU has repeatedly confirmed that the legal bases for processing in article 6 of the GDPR are exhaustive list of the cases in which processing of personal data can be regarded as lawful (Case C-252/21 Meta Platforms at paragraph 90; Case C-26/22 Case C-26/22 SHUFA Holding at paragraph 73).
52. Since its enactment, the principal law relied on to protect the confidentiality of personal data is the GDPR. The GDPR is underpinned by the fundamental rights to privacy and the protection of personal data in the Charter. One of the stated objectives of the GDPR is to secure the “protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data ” (Article 1(1)), with one of the principles of processing being integrity and confidentiality (article 5(1)(f). As noted above, the CJEU has repeatedly confirmed that the legal bases of processing in article 6 of the GDPR are an exhaustive list of the cases in which processing of personal data can be regarded as lawful (Case C-252/21 Meta Platforms at paragraph 90; Case C-26/22 SHUFA Holding at paragraph 73). Disclosure of personal data in a manner which is not lawful, within the meaning of article 6, is subject to sanction, including through the corrective powers of the supervisory authorities, in Ireland the Data Protection Commission. It is difficult to see how such provisions can be described as merely permissive and not protective. The protection of confidentiality under the GDPR is not absolute, but absolute protection is not required for the purpose of article 8(a)(i) of the AIE Regulations. I note the analysis of Hyland J in this regard (albeit relating to a different exception) in Commissioner for Environmental Information v Coillte Teoranta and others [2023] IEHC 227 at paragraphs 78-84.
53. It follows that, in order to determine whether the confidentiality of personal data is protected by the GDPR, one must consider whether there is a lawful basis under article 6(1) of the GDPR for disclosure. If there is a lawful basis for disclosure, the personal data may lawfully be disclosed, and the confidentiality of the personal data is not protected by the GDPR. Conversely, if there is no lawful basis for disclosure, the personal data may not be disclosed, and the confidentiality of the personal data is protected by the GDPR.
54. There are six lawful bases for processing personal data set out in article 6 of the GDPR. It appears that the most relevant basis to consider is article 6(1)(f), ‘necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party’. I will set out below my reasoning that article 6(1)(f) is the most appropriate basis to consider in this case.
55. In Case C180/21 Inspektor v Inspektorata kam Visshia sadeben savet, the CJEU found that processing by public authorities which is necessary for the performance of a task in the public interest comes within the scope of Article 6(1)(e) and cannot come within the scope of Article 6(1)(f), as those bases are mutually exclusive (paragraph 85). The Court found that the functions of bringing prosecutions and representing the State in an action for damages were public in nature and were ‘tasks’ of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Accordingly, the application of Article 6(1)(f) was excluded in respect of processing for that purpose (paragraphs 91-93). This case indicates that one must consider whether the purpose of the processing is the performance of a task in the public interest or whether the purpose is a different interest of a private nature (see paragraph 86). I note the Opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánches-Bordona, where he states that Article 6(1)(f) only applies “to conflicts between (private) parties whose interests are not public in nature ” (paragraph 96 of the Opinion). This passage would suggest that a public authority can never rely on Article 6(1)(f). However, this aspect of the Opinion does not appear to have been adopted by the Court, with the Court instead making a distinction between the interests of State authorities that are public in nature and those that are private in nature. For example, the Court made a contrast between the case at issue and a case in which the State is acting in defence of private interests (paragraph 92 of the Judgment).
56. In light of this case, I consider that the question for me is whether a public authority releasing information pursuant to an AIE request is doing so for the purposes of the performance of its tasks or for some other purpose. The term ‘task’ is not defined in the GDPR, but the use of that term in the CJEU’s recent case law gives some illustration as to its meaning. For example, the ‘task’ in Case C-180/21 involved bringing prosecutions and representing the State in an action against it for damages. In Case C-667/21 Krankenversicherung Nordrhein, the Court referred to the ‘statutory task’ of the medical service for health insurance funds.
57. In Case C-439/19, the Court referred to the ‘task ’ of the Latvian Road Safety Directorate of improving road safety. In each of these examples, the ‘task ’ of the body appears to refer to the functions that the particular body carries out, as opposed to the more general functions and duties applicable to all public bodies. When acting on AIE requests, public authorities are, of course, acting in accordance with their statutory duties under the AIE regime. Such duties apply generally to all public authorities. However, with the possible exception of my Office, I cannot identify any public authority whose ‘task ’ involves the release of information pursuant to AIE requests. Indeed, the release of information pursuant to an AIE request may conflict with the performance of the ‘tasks ’ of the public authority. For example, in a case where the effective performance of a public authority’s tasks requires that its proceedings remain confidential, a public authority may consider that release of information pursuant to an AIE request is positively inconsistent with the performance of its ‘tasks ’. By contrast, the release of environmental information pursuant to an AIE request is very much in the interest of the person requesting the information.
58. The duty of public authorities to release information facilitates the right of access of such a requester, which is conferred by the AIE regime. Taking this into account, it is my view that the release of information pursuant to an AIE request is not for the purposes of the performance of the tasks of the public body but is for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by a third party, the requester. Accordingly, I do not consider that disclosure pursuant to an AIE request involves the ‘performance of the tasks’ of the public authority and the exclusion in the final subparagraph of Article 6(1) does not apply.
59. That being so, there are "three cumulative conditions’ in order for processing to be lawful in accordance with Article 6(1)(f): “… first, the pursuit of a legitimate interest by the data controller or by a third party; second, the need to process personal data for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued; and third, that the interests or freedoms and fundamental rights of the person concerned by the data protection do not take precedence ” (Case C-597/19 M.I.C.M., at paragraph 106). For convenience, this is known as the ‘legitimate interest test .”
60. In relation to the first condition, the CJEU has confirmed that a wide range of interests is, in principle, capable of being regarded as legitimate (see Case C-26/22 SHUFA Holding at paragraph 76). For example, internet users may have a legitimate interest in having access to internet search engine results containing personal data ( Case C-131/12 Google Spain and Google , at paragraph 81); a person has a legitimate interest in obtaining the personal information of a person who damaged their property in order to sue ( Case C-13/16 Rigas Satiksme at paragraph 29); and a video surveillance system installed to protect the property, health and life of co-owners of a building is likely to be a legitimate interest ( Case C-708/18 Asociatia de Proprietari bloc M5A-ScaraA at paragraph 42). The purpose of the AIE regime is to promote increased public access to environmental information and more effective participation by the public in environmental decision-making, with the aim of making better decisions and applying them more effectively and, ultimately, promoting a better environment (see recitals 1 and 2 of the AIE Directive and Case C-470/19 Friends of the Irish Environment at paragraph 36). The AIE Directive expresses the provision of environmental information in response to an AIE request as a “right of access ”, which is conferred on any natural or legal person who makes an application for the information. Taking this into account and considering the wide range of interests confirmed as legitimate by the CJEU, I consider that a person who requests environmental information from a public authority has a legitimate interest in receiving the environmental information in question (subject to any other exceptions to the right of access that may apply). Accordingly, once a person has made a valid request for environmental information, the first condition of the legitimate interest test is met.
61. Where the environmental information in question is or includes personal data, the only way in which the legitimate interest in receiving the environmental information can be met is by providing access to the personal data in question. Accordingly, the second condition of the legitimate interest test is met.
62. As a result, in practice, it is the third condition of the legitimate interest test on which public authorities must focus most of their attention. The third condition requires ‘the balancing of the opposing rights and interests at issue’, depending on the specific circumstances of the particular case (see Case C-597/19 M.I.C.M., at paragraph 111).
63. In this context, the opposing interests will be, on the one hand, the right of the data subject to respect for privacy and protection of personal data and, on the other hand, the public interest in the disclosure of the environmental information at issue. This balancing exercise is almost identical to the balancing exercise that is required under Article 4(2) of the AIE Directive and article 10(3) of the AIE Regulations, where personal data is concerned. This means that, although as a matter of principle a public authority must carry out the balancing exercise in Article 6(1)(f) first and again (if needed) under article 10(3) of the AIE Regulations, in practice it is unnecessary for a public authority to go through the exercise twice because the analysis is the same. In my view this means that, in practice, public authorities may deal with AIE requests involving personal data in a relatively straightforward manner, consistent with both the AIE regime and the GDPR.
64. To summarise - once a public authority is satisfied of the following matters, the public authority may be satisfied that the requester has a ‘legitimate interest ’ in receiving the personal data pursuant to that request and that its disclosure is ‘necessary ’ to meet that interest:
• that an AIE request has been made,
• that the requested information is environmental information,
• that the environmental information is or includes personal data, and
• that the data subject has not consented to the disclosure of the personal data.
65. The public authority must then weigh the rights of the data subject against the public interest in the disclosure of the environmental information. In weighing that balance, the public authority should consider the specific interests at issue, namely:
• The individual’s interest in the protection of their personal data, taking into account the nature of the specific personal data at issue and the data subject’s rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, as well as any views expressed by the specific data subject regarding disclosure (if, in the circumstances, it is appropriate to seek the data subject’s views); and
• The public interest in disclosure of the environmental information, taking into account the public interest in the information at issue, as recognised by recital 1 of the AIE Directive and the rights in Articles 11 and 37 of the Charter, as well as any specific information that may have been volunteered by the requester (see Case C- 619/19 Land Baden-Württemberg, paragraphs 59-61).
66. As with any other exception to release under the AIE regime, if the public authority concludes that the balance falls against release of the personal data, it should go on to consider whether the personal data may be separated from the other environmental information at issue, for example by means of redaction (see Article 4(4) of the AIE Directive and article 10(5) of the AIE Regulations.
Application in this case
67. That this AIE request is invalid is not at issue in the case of this appeal, it is accepted by all that the request is a valid one and, as outlined in the previous section (paragraphs 30-41) I consider the information to be environmental information as defined by article 3(1).
68. The next question to consider therefore is whether the information in question, names and work contact details of Coillte employees, is personal data. Coillte have contended in its submission to this Office, noted above in paragraph 18, that this information is personal data, and I agree with this contention.
69. Next, on the issue of consent, I note that Coillte have affirmed in its submissions that consent is not held to share the information by the persons it concerns, this assertion is accepted.
70. Having determined the above matters, I am satisfied that the requester has a ‘legitimate interest ’ in receiving the personal data at issue pursuant to an AIE request and that its disclosure is ‘necessary ’ to meet that interest. I must go on to weigh the rights of the data subjects against the public interest in the disclosure of the environmental information. In respect of the individuals’ interests in the protection of their personal data in this case, I note the personal information in question does not fall under any of the special categories of personal data meriting higher protection (see Article 9, GDPR).
71. As I have set out above, although as a matter of principle a public authority must carry out the balancing exercise in Article 6(1)(f) first and again (if needed) under article 10(3) of the AIE Regulations, in practice it is unnecessary for me to go through the exercise twice because in this decision as the analysis is the same.
Balancing of Interests
72. As noted in preliminary matters in paragraph 11, Coillte failed to refer to article 8(a)(i) in its internal review decision, despite releasing two redacted records. I focus my attention therefore, on the public interest balancing test outlined in its submission to this Office, which was shared with the appellant outlined in paragraph 18.
73. Coillte have contended in this submission that disclosure of the redacted information would prejudice the privacy and confidentiality rights of those whose identities would be disclosed. Further that “there is a real risk that disclosure of the Redacted Information, which constitutes disclosure to the world at large, will not only prejudice the rights of those whose identities would be disclosed, but could consequently result in Coillte personnel being subjected to similar inappropriate communications and behaviour ” referencing behaviour it alleges occurred, further outlined in paragraph 18.
74. Coillte state further that “Coillte has determined that the factors in favour of disclosure are not outweighed by those favouring refusal of access, particularly as no information has been provided regarding the Appellant’s specific interests or motives in seeking the Redacted Information. Accordingly, Coillte is unable to weigh those considerations in the balance ”.
75. In considering the balance of interests, I must first note that the ‘specific interests or motives ’ of a requester who makes a request should not be considered as a negative inference in terms of balancing the interests of disclosure. While a public interest argument can be made by a requester to inform and assist the considerations of balancing interest, not making a motive or interest known cannot be used as a tool to refuse within this test.
76. I have considered the individual data subjects’ interest in the protection of their personal data, taking into account the nature of the specific personal data at issue and the data subject’s rights under Articles 7 and 8 of The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. I have considered the nature of the information is question, namely information regarding a person’s employment. I consider this to be at the less sensitive end of the scale of personal information, given that such information is often freely made available by data subjects on the internet and elsewhere. In noting the specific information at issue here however [name, email address and phone number], I am of the view that the internal phone number or mobile number of a staff member should be considered separately to the staff members name and details of their employment. An internal phone number or mobile number is generally not intended for use by the public in contacting members of a public authority, as public authorities generally provide contact information for members of the public on their websites. In relation to email addresses, I consider it to be appropriate to consider this alongside a staff name, as generally email addresses follow a defined format and it will be possible to discern the email address from an individual’s name.
77. When considering individuals’ interest in the protection of their personal data, I have taken into account whether there is likely to be any adverse effect for the individuals or otherwise, if their data is released.
78. I acknowledge the contentions which Coillte have put forward regarding its view that if the information is released there is a ‘real risk ’ of ‘inappropriate communications and behaviour ’ however in my view it has failed to demonstrate how the information contained in this appeal specifically may lead to such a risk. Coillte is an organisation who process a significant number of AIE requests annually, the risks which it has outlined would have to be considered on a case-by-case basis, rather than a blanket approach of redacted staff names and work contact details as a result of behaviour that allegedly occurred on foot of and in relation to, specific AIE requests.
79. While I do not intend to make light or disregard the potential impact of the behaviour described by Coillte, I want to note that I do not consider that a member of the public indicating their intention to report a public authority to an auditor or regulatory body such as the Soil Association to be an appropriate basis upon which to refuse access to environmental information where such bodies operate a process by which members of the public or stakeholders may make complaints regarding certified bodies. Further, I acknowledge the options open to any public authority to manage unreasonable behaviour if it arises, through health and safety policy, policies aimed to address unreasonable actions by the public who engage with them and, through contact with An Garda Síochána, if necessary. In my view it is not acceptable to blanketly redact and restrict staff information in response to the above-described alleged actions by members of the public which may or may not ever occur again and which may be managed through other actions, as I noted above.
80. In favour of release, I consider that there is an important general interest in the disclosure of environmental information to meet the purpose of the AIE Directive, in particular by contributing to a greater awareness of environmental matters, a free exchange of views, more effective participation by the public in environmental decision-making and, eventually, to a better environment, as set out in recital 1 to the AIE Directive, and the rights in Articles 11 and 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union.
81. I consider that those of us working in the civil and public sector should identify ourselves, in the spirit of public sector values such as accessibility, transparency and integrity. While it may be the case that in some circumstances it is not appropriate for staff names or other relevant details to be released through AIE, I am satisfied that this should only occur in exceptional circumstances. I am not persuaded that such circumstances are present in this case.
82. According to Coillte’s website, one of the main threats to biodiversity in Ireland is from the spread of invasive species because they can push out native species and alter ecosystem function. Species control is ongoing in many biodiversity areas across the Coillte estate, guided by plans developed by ecologists to ensure the approach is strategic and effective. I consider the issue of identification and control of invasive species to be of high public interest. The data subjects were working in a professional capacity for Coillte, and the emails exchanged during the course of their duties have been identified as pertaining to the identification/management of invasive species.
83. As noted above in paragraph 76, I do not consider that staff mobile or internal phone numbers can be considered on equal terms as staff names and email addresses. Given the purpose of such phone numbers, I consider that there is limited or no public interest in releasing phone numbers in circumstances where other avenues of communication with respect to access to information are open to the public.
84. Weighing the above interests in the balance, I conclude that the public interest in releasing the staff names and corresponding email addresses outweighs the interests served by the refusal. In considering the public interest in releasing the corresponding staff phone numbers, I am of the view that the public interest of disclosure does not outweigh the interest served by refusal.
85. I would emphasise that I consider each case that comes before me on its particular facts. It may be the case in certain circumstances that inappropriate behaviour by a requestor or other members of the public, or other particular circumstances may justify the redaction of staff names from information released under AIE. However, I am not satisfied that this threshold has been reached in this particular case.
86. Having carried out a review under article 12(5) of the AIE Regulations, I affirm Coillte’s internal review decision with respect to article 7(5) and annul its decision pertaining to articles 3(1) and 8(a)(i) regarding the redaction of staff names and email addresses, accordingly, I direct Coillte to release this information. I affirm the decision to redact staff mobile or internal phone numbers under article 8(a)(i).
87. A party to the appeal or any other person affected by this decision may appeal to the High Court on a point of law from the decision. Such an appeal must be initiated not later than two months after notice of the decision was given to the person bringing the appeal.
______________________
Ger Deering
Commissioner for Environmental Information