Cinneadh
Mr. Ken Foxe and DAA Public Limited Company
Ó Oifig an Choimisinéara um Fhaisnéis Comhshaoil
Cásuimhir: OCE-157533-L2S1V8
Foilsithe
Teanga: Níl leagan Gaeilge den mhír seo ar fáil.
Ó Oifig an Choimisinéara um Fhaisnéis Comhshaoil
Cásuimhir: OCE-157533-L2S1V8
Foilsithe
Teanga: Níl leagan Gaeilge den mhír seo ar fáil.
Whether DAA was justified in refusing access, under articles 8(a)(i), 8(a)(ii) and/or 9(1)(b) of the AIE Regulations, to information contained within the seven (7) records identified
10 July 2025
1. The “Dublin Airport passenger cap” is a planning related matter, which currently limits the number of passengers at Dublin Airport to 32 million a year. In recent years, the regulator (the Irish Aviation Authority) placed limits on slots for aircraft to take off and land at Dublin Airport to prevent a breach of the passenger cap. At this time, the High Court has suspended enforcement of the limit pending the outcome of legal challenges and is awaiting a ruling from European courts (See judgment in [2024] IEHC 758 delivered on 11 December 2024, available here ). The matter, in general, is regularly reported on in the media and political fora (See response in PQ [9707/25] Tuesday, 4 March 2025, available here for further context.)
2. On 31 July 2024, the appellant submitted an AIE request to DAA, as follows:
“Under the AIE Regulations, I am seeking the following:
- a copy of any representations received by [DAA] with regard to proposals for ending business aviation flights at the airport in order to keep within its current passenger cap.
- a copy of the response which was issued in each case.
- a copy of any correspondence between [DAA] and the Department of Transport with regard to the above.
I would prefer to receive this information electronically, ideally in its original electronic format. If you need to clarify anything in this request, please contact me via email.”
3. DAA identified seven (7) records as relevant to the request and refused access to this information, as follows:
• One (1) record was refused based on article 8(a)(ii) of the AIE Regulations – Record 1.1
• Six (6) records were refused based on article 9(1)(b) of the AIE Regulations – Records 1, 2, 3, 3.1, 4 and 4.1
4. The above decision was appealed to this Office in OCE-153314-C1S1K5 . In the decision on that appeal, dated 16 December 2024, the Commissioner found that DAA had not justified its reliance on article 8(a)(ii) or 9(1)(b) of the AIE Regulations and directed it to undertake a fresh internal review process in respect of the withheld information.
New Decision
5. On 14 March 2025, DAA issued a new internal review decision, including a schedule of records which indicated as follows:
• One (1) record was part-granted, with redaction applied based on article 8(a)(i) of the AIE Regulations – Record 1
• One (1) record was refused based on article 9(1)(b) of the AIE Regulations – Record 2
• Five (5) records were refused based on articles 8(a)(ii) and 9(1)(b) of the AIE Regulations – Records 1.1, 3, 3.1, 4 and 4.1
6. On 19 March 2025, the appellant submitted a further appeal to this Office.
7. On 27 March 2025, DAA was notified of the appellant’s request for a full review of the above decision, and it was requested to forward, within three (3) weeks or by 17 April 2025, the subject matter information/records at issue (“main records”) and a final submission explaining and justifying the basis for its decision. A submission was received from DAA on 2 May 2025 and the main records have also been provided.
8. I am directed by the Commissioner for Environmental Information to carry out a review of this appeal. I have now completed this review under article 12(5) of the Regulations. In so doing, I have had regard to all submissions made by the parties, and I have reviewed the records at issue. In addition, I have had regard to:
• the Guidance document provided by the Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government on the implementation of the AIE Regulations (‘the Minister’s Guidance’);
• Directive 2003/4/EC (the AIE Directive), upon which the AIE Regulations are based;
• the 1998 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (‘the Aarhus Convention’); and
• The Aarhus Convention – An Implementation Guide (Second edition, June 2014) (‘the Aarhus Guide’).
9. On 14 March 2025, DAA issued a revised decision to the appellant, which stated as follows:
“I made a decision on this review on 14/03/2025. I have determined that you should be granted access to 1 redacted record. Redactions will be made to personal information under Article 8 (a) (i).
In the case of the remaining 6 records, I have decided that these should be refused under the AIE Regulations pursuant to Article 8(a) (i) & 8. (a) (ii) and Article 9. (1) (b).”
10. However, in the accompanying schedule of records, article 8(a)(i) was cited only with reference to the decision in respect of one (1) record (not seven (7) records as indicated above). Also on this schedule, article 8(a)(ii) was cited in respect of five (5) records (not six (6) records as indicated above) and article 9(1)(b) was cited in respect of six (6) records.
11. The decision of DAA did not provide any further detail concerning its application of article 8(a)(i) of the AIE Regulations.
12. In relation to its use of article 8(a)(ii) of the AIE Regulations, DAA informed the appellant:
“For 4 of records , we have formally requested information from the third parties on 3 separate occasions regarding the release of each document. In these requests, we explained the nature of the AIE request and sought the third parties' consent to release the relevant records.
We have been instructed by one of our third parties not to share the documents related to your request. We have not received a response from a second third party regarding the release of these documents and, therefore, we do not have permission to release them. Commercial third parties are not subject to AIE regulations. Third parties corresponding with daa in confidence would expect that their correspondence would not be released without their consent.”
(Emphasis added. See above, article 8(a)(ii) was applied to 5-6 records)
13. In relation to its use of article 9(1)(b) of the AIE Regulations, DAA informed the appellant:
“We are refusing 2 records on the basis of 9 (1) (b), as these are daa documents which refer to issues related to the 32m terminal cap at Dublin Airport. The 32m terminal cap at Dublin Airport (the “Terminal Cap”) is currently subject to a Section 152 of the Planning & Development Act 2000, as amended, process. There are also a number of judicial review proceedings currently being taken by airlines which operate at Dublin Airport, which relate to the Terminal Cap and in which daa is participating. Consequently, it would not be appropriate for correspondence and documentation regarding the Terminal Cap and issues inextricably linked to this case, to be released while the issue remains in a statutory process.
These documents deal with options that daa has been required to consider in the context of the terminal cap litigation referred to above. The disclosure of these documents would negatively impact daa’s ability to weigh options as to how to best deal with contentious legal issues and would run counter to the intention of section 9.1.b which is very clearly framed to ensure that a party’s ability to defend itself in litigation is not negatively impacted by a required disclosure
To address the concern that we might have applied this exemption indiscriminately, we must clarify that each document in question has been individually assessed to determine the applicability of the exemption. This ensures that the exemption is applied appropriately and in accordance with the relevant guidelines, rather than being used as a blanket measure. By doing so, we maintain compliance and uphold the integrity of our review process.”
(Emphasis added. See above, article 9(1)(b) was applied to 6 records)
14. In relation to article 10(1) of the AIE Regulations, DAA informed the appellant:
“… I have, in accordance with Article 10(1), examined whether your request relates to information on environmental emissions and have determined that it does not.”
15. In relation to its use of article 10(3) and 10(4) of the AIE Regulations, DAA informed the appellant:
“… I have carefully weighed the public interest served by disclosure against the interest served by refusing your request. After thorough consideration, I have determined that disclosing the information you requested would not serve the public interest.
There is no overriding public interest in disclosure that would justify the serious risks posed to commercial confidentiality with a commercial third party (not subject to the AIE regulations), which would diminish the ability of daa to effectively manage its business. Based on this assessment, the confidentiality of correspondence with commercial third parties must be maintained in accordance with Article. 8. (a)(ii) of the AIE Regulations, alongside applicable legal protections under company law, data protection law, and commercial confidentiality principles. Therefore, I have determined that the information should remain confidential to protect the interests of all involved.
With respect to those records being refused under article 9.1.b, the public interest in parties to litigation not being unfairly prejudiced by the disclosure of related documents during the currently of that litigation, outweighs the public interest in disclosure of these documents.”
16. DAA’s revised decision made no reference to article 10(5) of the AIE Regulations.
17. In submissions to this Office dated 2 May 2025, DAA simply repeated the above points in justification of its revised decision.
18. While the AIE Regulations do not explicitly provide that the burden of proof rests with the public authority in relation to justifying a refusal to make information available, the Commissioner considers that the scheme of the Regulations, and of Directive 2003/4/EC upon which the Regulations are based, makes it clear that there is a presumption in favour of release of environmental information.
19. The judgment of the High Court inRight to Know v An Taoiseach [2018] IEHC 371 notes that “the mere invoking of the statutory ground upon which disclosure of environmental information may be exempted cannot, to my mind, constitute a sufficient reason for the refusal”. This view aligns with the decision of the Court of Justice of the EU in C-619/19Land Baden Württemberg v DR . This decision contains some useful guidance in relation to the application of exceptions generally. The CJEU noted in particular, at paragraph 69 of its judgment: “As the Advocate General has observed in point 34 of his Opinion, [the] obligation to state reasons is not fulfilled where a public authority merely refers formally to one of the exceptions provided for in Article 4(1) of Directive 2003/4. On the contrary, a public authority which adopts a decision refusing access to environmental information must set out the reasons why it considers that the disclosure of that information could specifically and actually undermine the interest protected by the exceptions relied upon. The risk of that interest being undermined must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical.”
20. In accordance with article 12(5) of the AIE Regulations, the role of this Office is to review DAA’s internal review decision and to affirm, annul or vary it. Where appropriate in the circumstances of an appeal, the Commissioner will require the public authority to make available environmental information to the appellant.
21. As outlined above, the revised decision by DAA and its (identical) submission to this Office are not clear in terms of what exceptions it seeks to rely upon on in respect of each record withheld, i.e. the contents of DAA’s cover decision letter and submission are inconsistent with the decisions noted against each record in the accompanying schedule of records.
22. A review by this Office is considered to bede novo , which means that it is based on the circumstances and the law at the time of this decision. Accordingly, in the interests of completeness and efficiency in processing this appeal, I consider it appropriate to examine each of the exceptions cited by DAA in respect of all the withheld information.
23. This review is therefore concerned with whether DAA was justified in refusing access, under articles 8(a)(i), 8(a)(ii) and/or 9(1)(b) of the AIE Regulations, to any information contained within the seven (7) records concerned – Records 1, 1.1, 2, 3, 3.1, 4 and 4.1 .
24. It should be noted that, while the Commissioner is required by article 12(5)(b) of the AIE Regulations to specify reasons for his decision, he must also be careful not to disclose withheld information in his decisions. This means that the detail that I can give about the content of the information and the extent to which I can describe certain matters in the below analysis is limited.
25. As noted above, matters concerning the Dublin Airport passenger cap are regularly reported on in the media. As such, there is a lot of information already in the public domain regarding the passenger cap and related issues. Furthermore, I consider that given the scale of publicity, many interested and/or affected parties are likely to have made their positions publicly known.
26. Further to the appellant’s specific AIE request, and as can be observed from the schedule of records provided to the appellant, the records at issue in this case relate to a proposal to restrict business aviation flights at Dublin Airport from early 2024.The records identified by DAA can be further described or grouped as follows:
• Communication dated 15 November 2023 from a Consultancy Firm to DAA enclosing a joint communication on behalf of two (2) Aviation Industry Associations (Records 3 and 3.1 ); and DAA’s response dated 21 November 2023 (Records 4 and 4.1 ).
• Joint Communication dated 7 December 2023 from two (2) Aviation Industry Firms to DAA (Records 1 and 1.1 ); and DAA’s response dated 8 December 2023 (Record 2 ).
27. Articles 8 and 9 of the AIE Regulations provide certain grounds for refusal of information. Both articles must be read alongside article 10 of the AIE Regulations. Article 10(1) provides that notwithstanding articles 8 and 9(1)(c) of the AIE Regulations, a request for environmental information shall not be refused where the request relates to information on emissions into the environment. Article 10(3) requires a public authority to consider each request on an individual basis and weigh the public interest served by disclosure against the interest served by refusal. Article 10(4) provides that the grounds for refusal of a request shall be interpreted on a restrictive basis having regard to the public interest served by disclosure. Article 10(5) provides that nothing in article 8 or 9 shall authorise a public authority not to make available environmental information which, although held with information to which article 8 or 9 relates, may be separated from such information.
28. When relying on articles 8 or 9 of the AIE Regulations a public authority must demonstrate a clear link between disclosure of the specific information that it has withheld and any adverse effect. It must set out the reasons why it considers that the disclosure of the information at issue could specifically and actually undermine the interest protected by the exceptions relied upon, as set out by the CJEU at paragraph 69 ofLand Baden-Wurttemberg v DR , Case C-619/19. This sets a high threshold as the risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical. A mere assertion of an expectation of harm is not sufficient.
29. As DAA ought to be aware (as highlighted in the Commissioner’s decision in OCE-153314-C1S1K5 and in other decisions issued by this Office over the past eighteen months involving DAA), the duty to give reasons, for the refusal of requests, arises not only by virtue of the AIE Regulations and Directive, but is recognised generally as a core principle of administrative law and a fundamental element of constitutional justice (see, for example,Meadows v Minister for Justice [2010] IESC 3 andBalz & Anor v An Bord Pleanála & Ors [2019] IESC 90). Similarly, articles 7(4) and 11(4) of the AIE Regulations require public authorities to provide reasons for refusal at both original and internal review decision stage, consistent with Article 4(5) of the AIE Directive. In this regard, the High Court inRight to Know v An Taoiseach [2018] IEHC 372 noted, in particular, that “in light of the adjudicatory processes in which a decision-maker is required to engage pursuant to [a]rticles 10(3), (4) and (5) and 11(4) of the AIE Regulations, the mere invoking of the statutory ground upon which disclosure of environmental information may be exempted cannot, to my mind, constitute a sufficient reason for the refusal” (paragraph 106). The Court held that in an absence of any indicator in the review decision that the balancing exercise mandated by articles 10(3) and (4) had been carried out, suggested that no balancing exercise had, in fact, been undertaken and that the same was true in respect of the mandatory obligation set out in article 10(5) of the AIE Regulations (paragraph 87).
30. Article 8(a)(i) of the AIE Regulations provides that a public authority shall not make available environmental information where disclosure of the information would adversely affect the confidentiality of personal information relating to a natural person who has not consented to the disclosure of the information, and where that confidentiality is otherwise protected by law. This provision seeks to transpose Article 4(2)(f) of the AIE Directive, which in turn is based on Article 4(4)(f) of the Aarhus Convention.
31. When relying on article 8(a)(i) of the AIE Regulations a public authority must show that –
a) the information at issue is personal information relating to a natural person, who has not consented to its disclosure,
b) the personal information has an element of confidentiality,
c) the confidentiality of that personal information is protected by law, and
d) the disclosure of the information at issue would adversely affect that confidentiality.
32. The risk of the confidentiality being undermined must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical. The public authority must demonstrate a clear link between disclosure of the specific information that it has withheld and any adverse effect.
33. In its fresh decision following the Commissioner’s remittal of this case, DAA simply stated that“Redactions will be made to personal information under Article 8 (a) (i)” and provided no further detail regarding its application of the provision. While redactions were made to Record 1, no similar redactions were indicated under article 8(a)(i) in respect of the remaining records. However, as outlined above, I consider it appropriate for this review to examine each of the withheld records in this case.
34. Having examined each of the seven (7) records, I am satisfied that the information therein which could invoke article 8(a)(i) of the AIE Regulations can be described as follows:
• the names of eight (8) staff members of a public authority (DAA), their business email addresses, and, in some cases, their business contact numbers and job titles.
• the name of one (1) staff member of a private consultancy firm, their business email address, business contact numbers and job title.
• the names of five (5) staff members of two (2) Aviation Industry Firms their business email addresses, and, in one (1) case, their business contact numbers and job title.
• the names of two (2) staff members of two (2) Aviation Industry Associations and their job titles.
35. The appellant has confirmed to this Office that he does not require any email addresses or telephone numbers to be released to him. This information is therefore outside the scope of the request.
36. In its decision, DAA provided no evidence that any of the individuals concerned did not consent to disclosure of the above information. DAA also provided no explanation as to whether the confidentiality of any such information is provided by law, nor did it identify any law upon which it was relying. No attempt was made by DAA to identify whether any such confidentiality would be adversely affected by the release of the above information. Furthermore, DAA gave no detail regarding any public interest balancing exercise carried out with respect to information withheld under article 8(a)(i).
37. Having carefully considered the above information, I am not satisfied that this information can be considered to be confidential. For example, basic internet searches for the individuals concerned will identify their positions within their respective companies, and in some cases, their business contact information is also publicly available. It is therefore the case that the disclosure of the information would not adversely affect the confidentiality of the information as required to engage article 8(a)(i) of the AIE Regulations. Accordingly, I find that article 8(a)(i) does not apply to the above information.
38. Article 8(a)(ii) of the AIE Regulations provides that a public authority shall not make available environmental information where disclosure of the information would adversely affect the interests of any person (including legal persons such as companies) who, voluntarily and without being under, or capable of being put under, a legal obligation to do so, supplied the information requested, unless that person has consented to the release of that information. This provision transposes article 4(2)(g) of the AIE Directive, which in turn is based on Article 4(4)(g) of the Aarhus Convention.
39. When relying on article 8(a)(ii) of the AIE Regulations a public authority must show that –
a) the person who supplied the information at issue to the public authority did so voluntarily and without being under, or being capable of being put under a legal obligation to do so,
b) the person did not consent to the release of that information; and
c) the disclosure of the information at issue would adversely affect the interests of the person.
40. Firstly, it is unclear which records that DAA seeks to engage article 8(a)(ii) of the AIE Regulations in respect of. However, I consider that this exception can only be applied to information provided to a public authority. Therefore, having examined each of the seven (7) records, I am satisfied that the only records which could potentially engage article 8(a)(ii) of the AIE Regulations are Records 1, 1.1, 3 and 3.1, being correspondence from certain private firms/associations provided to the DAA (see para 26. above).
41. In its fresh decision following the Commissioner’s remittal of this case, DAA stated that it had consulted with the third parties, as follows:
“For 4 of records, we have formally requested information from the third parties on 3 separate occasions regarding the release of each document. In these requests, we explained the nature of the AIE request and sought the third parties' consent to release the relevant records.
We have been instructed by one of our third parties not to share the documents related to your request. We have not received a response from a second third party regarding the release of these documents and, therefore, we do not have permission to release them. Commercial third parties are not subject to AIE regulations. Third parties corresponding with daa in confidence would expect that their correspondence would not be released without their consent.”
42. I accept DAA’s position in the above regard and I have not sought access to said consultation records. I have also assessed whether it is necessary for this Office to separately notify/consult third parties, and I have determined that this is not required in the circumstances of this case.
43. As with all exceptions under article 8 and 9 of the AIE Regulations, the threshold necessary to justify non-disclosure, because of adverse effect, is a high one. In the case of article 8(a)(ii), the effect must be on the interests of the person who voluntarily provided the information, and it must be adverse. DAA’s submissions contain no reference to the specific information being withheld and it has not identified any harm to any third-party interests. In relation to the comments made by DAA in relation to the expectations of the third parties that information would not be released without consent, I would note that any third party corresponding with a body that is subject to the AIE Regulations should be aware that information held by that public authority may be subject to release under the AIE Regulations. While it may be appropriate for a third party to be consulted, depending on the circumstances of the request, consent is not a determining factor as to whether or not information will be released.
44. I note the DAA’s comments that, “There is no overriding public interest in disclosure that would justify the serious risks posed to commercial confidentiality with a commercial third party (not subject to the AIE regulations), which would diminish the ability of daa to effectively manage its business.” (Emphasis added) However, the purpose of the exception provided by article 8(a)(ii) is to encourage the voluntary flow of environmental information from third parties to public authorities and therefore the exception can only apply where disclosure would result in an adverse effect on the information provider’s interests. It does not apply to the interests of the public authority.
45. In the absence of any arguments from DAA regarding any causal relationship between disclosure and any adverse effects on the information providers, I have examined the withheld information myself, as outlined at points 24. and 25. above. The information consists of two (2) cover emails and two (2) respective attachments (letters) provided to DAA in November/December 2023 raising concerns regarding a proposal to restrict business aviation flights at Dublin Airport from early 2024 and the economic and commercial impact this would have, along with suggested mitigation strategies.
46. Having reviewed the withheld information I am unable to determine any adverse effects upon the firms/associations which may be caused by disclosure of the withheld information. In contrast, I consider that these aviation firms/associations would still have powerful incentives to engage with and provide information to DAA if it would lead to opportunities for support. I note DAA’s view that “commercial third parties” have an expectation that the information they provide would remain confidential. However, DAA has not provided any evidence that this is the case, and I am not convinced on this point. In my view, the aviation companies should be aware that the AIE regime give rights of public access to information held by public authorities and that a public authority is entitled to disclose information in certain circumstances, even where the information providers have not consented to disclosure.
47. As outlined above, I note that a large amount of information relating to the Dublin Airport passenger cap matter is available publicly, including some which is clearly linked to the withheld information, as follows:
48. Given this, I consider that any arguments which might have been made for withholding the information would be considerably lessened, given the amount of information already in the public domain. For the reasons set out above, I find that article 8(a)(ii) of the AIE Regulations does not apply to the above information. In the circumstances, I am not required to consider article 10.
49. Article 9(1)(b) of the AIE Regulations provides that a public authority may refuse to make available environmental information where disclosure of the information requested would adversely affect the course of justice (including criminal inquiries and disciplinary inquiries). This provision seeks to transpose Article 4(2)(c) of the AIE Directive, which in turn is based on Article 4(4)(c) of the Aarhus Convention.
50. Again, it is unclear which records that DAA seeks to engage article 9(1)(b) of the AIE Regulations in respect of. Therefore, I will consider this provision in respect of all withheld information.
51. In its fresh decision following the Commissioner’s remittal of this case, DAA stated that it was refusing documents “which refer to issues related to the 32m terminal cap at Dublin Airport [which] is currently subject to a Section 152 of the Planning & Development Act 2000, as amended, process [and] a number of judicial review proceedings...” (see also para 13. above).
52. The Commissioner’s decision dated 16 December 2024 in this matter, outlined the requirements in order to engage article 9(1)(b) of the AIE Regulations (See para 10. to 20). Accordingly, I will not repeat that detail in full here, however I will draw attention to the following comments made:
“15. I am not satisfied that DAA has explained how the release of the records at issue could adversely affect the course of justice. DAA has not addressed the specifics of the information requested or explained in any meaningful way how the release of the 7 records would adversely affect the course of justice with regards the “active Section 152 of the Planning and Development Act 2000” which it says the passenger cap is subject to. Not all records whose subject matter relates to the passenger cap at Dublin Airport will be exempt from release under article 9(1)(b) purely by virtue of fact that there are ongoing statutory proceedings at play.
16. I must remind DAA that the fact that information may relate to ongoing legal or statutory proceedings does not, in and of itself, establish that its disclosure would adversely affect the course of justice; otherwise the AIE Regulations would provide for a class-based exemption for such information, which they do not.
17. DAA has not explained how the specific information sought is relevant to the proceedings identified. Furthermore, DAA has not explained in any detail that an adverse effect is reasonably foreseeable within the terms of the exemption.”
53. On this occasion, in relation to adverse effect, DAA stated: “These documents deal with options that daa has been required to consider in the context of the terminal cap litigation referred to above. The disclosure of these documents would negatively impact daa’s ability to weigh options as to how to best deal with contentious legal issues and would run counter to the intention of section 9.1.b which is very clearly framed to ensure that a party’s ability to defend itself in litigation is not negatively impacted by a required disclosure”.
54. I have examined the withheld information, and I have considered DAA’s reasoning. Although DAA has pointed to an ongoing planning process and ongoing litigation, it is not clear how either of these matters would be affected by disclosure of the specific records concerned, not to mention suffer an adverse effect. I am also cognisant of the considerable amount of information relating to these matters that is already available publicly, including some which is clearly linked to the withheld information (see para 47. above).
55. Furthermore, regarding articles 10(3) and 10(4) of the AIE Regulations, DAA simply stated “I have carefully weighed the public interest served by disclosure against the interest served by refusing your request. After thorough consideration, I have determined that disclosing the information you requested would not serve the public interest” and “With respect to those records being refused under article 9.1.b, the public interest in parties to litigation not being unfairly prejudiced by the disclosure of related documents during the currently of that litigation, outweighs the public interest in disclosure of these documents.” DAA did not specify any information that it had particular concerns about, nor did it give any further indication of any factors for or against release considered or detail regarding any balancing exercise carried out. It also gave no consideration to whether partial disclosure of any of the records refused under article 9(1)(b) of the AIE Regulations was possible in line with article 10(5) of the AIE Regulations.
56. Overall, in the circumstances of this case and having examined the content of the records at issue, I find that article 9(1)(b) does not apply to the above information.
57. It is clear that DAA has not provided adequate reasoning for refusal of the records at issue. Having regard to all of the above, I cannot find that the DAA’s decision under articles 8(a)(i), 8(a)(ii) and/or 9(1)(b) of the AIE Regulations, to refuse information contained within the seven (7) records is justified.
58. As outlined above, this case relates to a previous decision of this Office wherein the Commissioner annulled DAA’s decision on the basis of inadequate reasoning and directed it to undertake a fresh internal review decision-making process. In such circumstances, I do not consider it appropriate to remit the matter to DAA for a second time. Accordingly, I direct release of the information at issue.
59. As noted above, the appellant has excluded any email addresses or telephone numbers from the scope of his request. This is therefore the only information that should be redacted from the relevant records.
60. Having carried out a review under article 12(5) of the AIE Regulations on behalf of the Commissioner for Environmental Information, I hereby annul DAA’s decision in respect of the seven (7) records and direct it to release the information concerned to the appellant.
61. A party to the appeal or any other person affected by this decision may appeal to the High Court on a point of law from the decision. Such an appeal must be initiated not later than two months after notice of the decision was given to the person bringing the appeal.
Julie O’Leary
On behalf of the Commissioner for Environmental Information